the creation of values, and thus to hold our ideals accountable to the bodies they are enabling us to become. We must generate ideals of sexual difference (as well as of sexual differences) that, as Zarathustra says, "remain faithful to the earth" (Nietzsche 1968, 188-89) . Perhaps the fact that Zarathustra, at the end of the Fourth Part, descends his mountain in search of his "children" (438) signals Nietzsche's awareness that Zarathustra, though as male/female as Oppel implies, still cannot give birth to (himself as) the Übermensch on his own. He must enter into an enabling interdependence with "woman."
The question that arises at the end of Oppel's work, then, is how: how do we generate ideals of sexual difference(s) that encourage and enable our participation in the ongoing creation of those ideals? It is a question Oppel does not ask. Her concern is to establish that we can and should, and that Nietzsche opens a space in which to do so. Yet the question is critical to understanding what Nietzsche means by beyond. Answers to it are implied within Nietzsche's description of ideal creation as a bodily process (LaMothe 2005). As Nietzsche confirms, we cannot refute ideals; they live in and as our bodies. We must rather cultivate a new physiological perspective that will enable us to see our values as expressions of our health. As Zarathustra the dancer teaches, we must engage in bodily practices that refine our senses, strengthen our instincts, and stir and release our creative energies. Further exploration of these bodily dimensions of ideal creation will provide Oppel's open-ended work with the future directions she seeks. books and, more importantly, to the philosophical works of Beauvoir herself. Ongoing and growing interest in her writing gives meaning to the project she began so many years ago. As she says, "The book that I write does not fill a void shaped in advance exactly like it. The book is first, and once it is, it is up to the reader to grasp its presence as the reverse of an absence: his freedom alone decides" (128).
In What emerges from the essays Philosophical Writings collects will neither shock nor surprise Beauvoir scholars but it is sure to delight. The essays span twenty-three years, from her student work analyzing a book by Claude Bernard in 1924 to two essays published for an American audience in 1947 ("An Existentialist Looks at Americans" and "What Is Existentialism?"). Much of the interim period is known as her "moral period." Simons includes five pieces from this period: "Pyrrhus and Cineas" (1944) (1946) , each of which contributed to the mistaken impression that Beauvoir was more of a disciple than an innovator. But, as the authors of the introductions argue, a more nuanced reading enlightened by what we now know of the Beauvoir-Sartre relationship proves Beauvoir's originality as well as her critical reading of Sartre's texts. Finally, the second largest selection in the volume is the translation of the "Two Unpublished Chapters from She Came to Stay" (1943) . Many, though not all, of these essays have been available in French collections. Although "An Eye for an Eye" was previously translated (Beauvoir 1947) , this volume includes a new translation; "An Existentialist Looks at Americans" was originally published in English; all other essays are original translations. Collecting these particular pieces in one book invites a fresh look into Beauvoir's project-dare we say even her "system" of philosophy? Beauvoir adeptly applied her existentialist eye to everything from literature and the death penalty to American consumerism.
An introduction to each essay summarizes the selection and situates it historically as well as within the context of Beauvoir's philosophical oeuvre. Moreover, these introductions, by Kristana Arp, Nancy Bauer, Debra Bergoffen, Edward Fullbrook, Sara Heinämaa, Eleanore Holveck, Sonia Kruks, Shannon Mussett, Hélène N. Peters, Margaret Simons, Karen Vintges, and Gail Weiss, bring together some of the luminaries of Beauvoirian scholarship. Beauvoir's dictum that "A book is a collective object" takes on new meaning as these scholars enter into a sort of dialogue regarding Beauvoir's philosophical project and the influence of these texts. Subjectivity and solidarity, existentialism and phenomenology-especially in literary texts-and public opinion are three sustaining topics of this extended conversation but readers will also notice many other currents uniting the essays. Candide's Garden serves as a counterpoint within two of Beauvoir's essays, and the droll but honest phrase, "No man is a hero to his valet," crops up a few times in her discussions of the legitimate ends of moral action. These texts demonstrate Beauvoir's strength as a philosopher as well as her keen observation of humanity.
Beauvoir's notions of subjectivity and solidarity take center stage in many of the essays but never more poignantly than in the "Two Unpublished Chapters from She Came to Stay." Describing Françoise's childhood and adolescence, Beauvoir demonstrates the development of subjectivity. As Françoise becomes aware of her own freedom, she has to overcome the temptation to accept the world as her parents, teachers, and friends define it. Élisabeth, Pierre's sister, serves as a sort of foil as Françoise moves from admiring her friend's apparent independence of all public opinion as a sort of absolute to wondering about Élisabeth's almost fawning behavior toward Pierre and her cousins-the absolute slipping away. As Fullbrook argues in his introduction to the piece, many of the existential and phenomenological elements found in these two chapters were transferred to the final text that begins with Françoise as an adult. Nevertheless, the child Françoise invites further literary and philosophical study as an interesting character in her own right.
Perhaps the most notable piece in the collection, the original translation of "Pyrrhus and Cineas," offers a theoretical exploration of subjectivity and opens the question of solidarity as well. Beauvoir discusses, for instance, not just the question "Why act at all?" but also the ends of our actions, "What, then, is the measure of man? What goals can he set for himself, and what homes are permitted him?" (91). Her answer, which is echoed in subsequent essays in the volume, begins by reconceptualizing a goal: "The goal is a goal only at the end of the path. As soon as it is attained, it becomes a new starting point" (99). But individuals do not undertake projects in isolation; rather, the project "throws me into this world and toward these men" (140), "we need others in order for our existence to become founded and necessary" (129). Solidarity is the recognition that the freedom of others gives meaning to one's project.
"Literature and Metaphysics" and "A Review of Phenomenology of Perception by Maurice Merleau-Ponty" further highlight Beauvoir's unique brand of existentialism and phenomenology. In "Literature and Metaphysics," she argues that the novel evokes the ambiguity of existence but that an author who sets out to disguise "a preconstructed ideological framework in a fictional, more or less shimmering garment" fails to communicate authentically with the reader and "then, most certainly, [the novel] should be condemned" (272). Beauvoir's review of Phenomenology of Perception demonstrates her divergence from Sartre as she affirms the situatedness of the body that presupposes a history as well as a present that belies the Sartrean for-itself of Being and Nothingness (1943) .
Public opinion receives its most scathing critique in "An Eye for an Eye," "Existentialism and Popular Wisdom," and "An Existentialist Looks at Americans" but it is also a strong undercurrent of the discussion in "Moral Idealism and Political Realism." The public, more often than not, strives to maintain hold on some absolutes in the manner of the serious-minded. As Beauvoir shows, however, an existential approach with freedom at its base requires a more nuanced attitude that embraces the ambiguity of existence and the antinomies of action.
Beauvoir's real-life observations of America aim at the very heart of "American civilization": "Does it justify their existence?" (307). Whereas much about American ingenuity and ambition coheres with existentialist tenets, one serious flaw Beauvoir observes is "a tendency in America to be fascinated by the bare results without concern for the human existence that was staked on it" (309). Elsewhere, she describes what is lost as "the movement of the spirit which engendered" that which is sought (310). An insightful application of her existentialism, Beauvoir shows that American achievement that condemns the past is bound itself to be condemned. Time becomes the American's dominator: "Here a vicious circle is formed. It is because the present is permitted to pass unloved that a new present is incessantly required, and feverishly solicited in change, sensation, etc. But the present will never exist . . . since the way it has been sought for has emptied it of content" (311). Money becomes the only end in such a system to the neglect of the human mind and freedom.
The translation of "Pyrrhus and Cineas" in and of itself makes this book a valuable resource for Beauvoir scholars. But it is also worth noting that "An Eye for an Eye," "An Existentialist Looks at Americans," "What Is Existentialism?" and "Moral Idealism and Political Realism" (and their introductions) would serve as useful stand-alone articles in undergraduate courses that seek to include some discussion of existentialism. While none of the pieces collected in this volume is explicitly feminist, all but a few presage something from Beauvoir's most famous book, The Second Sex. Feminists outside the discipline of philosophy will thus find the volume useful as well. The editors and contributors to Simone de Beauvoir: Philosophical Writings have crafted an engaging text that is sure to encourage a deeper interest in the study of Beauvoir and her place in the philosophical canon.
Intersectionality is believed to be democratic because women of color now have the authority, demanded by them and sanctioned by white feminists, to create their own feminisms. But, as a theory of women's identity, intersectionality is not inclusive insofar as members of specific intersections of race and class can create only their own feminisms. (2) And so, instead of a unified women's movement grounded in a theory of women's commonality, we ended up with the shards and splats of narrowly focused identity-based feminisms.
The good news, according to Zack, is that it is possible for feminists not simply to put Humpty back together again (why do that, if Humpty was myopically constructed to begin with?) but to craft a new and much better version. Indeed, with the right ingredients, Zack urges, feminists can build a movement that could create a world in which "the governments of all the major countries in the world will be controlled by women," their rule having as its "two universal objectives . . . the end of violence and the preservation of natural environments" (164).
